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GOD, FREEDOM, AND HUMAN AGENCY
Thomas Talbott
I argue that, contrary to the opinion of Wes Morriston, William Rowe, and 
others, a supremely perfect God, if one should exist, would be the freest of 
all beings and would represent the clearest example of what it means to act 
freely. I suggest further that, if we regard human freedom as a reflection of 
God’s ideal freedom, we can avoid some of the pitfalls in both the standard 
libertarian and the standard compatibilist accounts of freewill.
My purpose in this paper is to set forth a theory of agency that makes no 
appeal to mysterious notions of agent causation. But lest I be misunderstood 
at the very outset, I should perhaps clarify the point that my emphasis here 
is on the term “mysterious” and not on the expression “agent causation.” 
I shall begin with what seems to me the best possible example of agent 
causation: the sense in which a supremely perfect God, if one should ex-
ist, would initiate or originate his own actions. I shall not, however, simply 
adopt without modification the standard understanding of agent causa-
tion, assuming there to be such an understanding. I shall not make it true 
by definition, for example, that an agent-caused event can occur only in 
a context of alternative possibilities and hence can never be necessitated. 
Neither shall I make it true by definition that the internal states of an agent 
can never determine, or even causally determine in the case of human 
beings, a genuine instance of agent causation.1 Instead, I shall begin with 
the assumption that God represents the best and the clearest example of 
1Although many agency theorists argue that in the nature of the case no in-
stance of agent causation can itself be causally determined, at least a few disagree. 
A notable example is Richard Taylor, who insists that “the claim of determinism 
. . . does not by itself require us to deny that there are agents who sometimes initi-
ate their own acts.” (Action and Purpose [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966], 
p. 115). Another is William Hasker, who observes that “the event, S’s causing e, 
essentially involves S’s reasons for causing e”; he then points out that “on occasion 
(though certainly not always) one’s reasons may be so compelling as to literally 
‘leave one with no alternative.’” The reasons, in other words, may be “so strong 
that they, in effect, preclude any other course of action” [The Emergent Self (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 106–107]. Such cases may not 
be instances of free action, in Hasker’s view, but they are genuine instances of ac-
tion and therefore of agent causation. Others, such as Timothy O’Connor, disagree 
(see Persons and Causes [Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000], p. 
61). Given such a disagreement over such a fundamental issue, one might wonder 
whether any specific understanding of agent causation can justifiably be regarded 
as standard. But for the record, my own sympathies lie with Hasker on this issue.
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agent causation and then explore some implications of this assumption 
for the concept of human agency. I shall also argue that, contrary to the 
opinion of Wes Morriston, William Rowe, and others, the Anselmian God 
would be the freest of all beings and would represent, indeed, the clearest 
example of what it means to act freely.2 The idea of divine freedom can 
even provide a perspective, I believe, from which to evaluate the ongoing 
dispute between libertarians and compatibilists and can, in the end, help 
to bring these two warring camps a bit closer together.
The remarkable thing is that the negative libertarian arguments against 
the compatibilist view (e.g., the worry that unbroken causal determinism 
is indistinguishable from external manipulation3) and the negative com-
patibilist arguments against the libertarian view (e.g., the worry that inde-
terminism is indistinguishable from random chance) both seem initially 
plausible. Given that libertarians and compatibilists hold contrary views 
rather than contradictory ones, moreover, we must at least consider the 
possibility that both views are mistaken.4 One might even wonder whether 
the concept of freewill is itself incoherent. In this paper, however, I shall 
argue, first, that a proper understanding of divine freedom can point to a 
way out of the quagmire; second, that the way out is to understand human 
freedom as a reflection, however pale it may be, of God’s ideal freedom; 
and third, that such an understanding will enable one to avoid some of 
the pitfalls in both the standard libertarian and the standard compatibilist 
accounts of freewill.5
2For my earlier defense of the idea that God is the freest of all beings, see Thomas 
Talbott, “On the Divine Nature and the Nature of Divine Freedom,” Faith and Phi-
losophy 5 (1988), pp. 3–24; for a more recent defense of a similar view, see Edward 
Wierenga, “The Freedom of God,” Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 425–436; and 
for criticisms of this view, see Wes Morriston, “Is God Free? Reply to Wierenga,” 
Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006), pp. 93–98 and William Rowe, Can God Be Free? (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
3The argument that unbroken determinism would be indistinguishable from 
freedom-removing external manipulation has received a lot of attention in recent 
literature. For an important statement of this argument, see Derk Pereboom, Living 
Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 110–126.
4For important contemporary arguments against both views, see Richard Dou-
ble, The Non-reality of Free Will (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991) and Pereboom, Living Without Free Will.
5But just what, one might ask, is the standard libertarian account of freewill? 
That is certainly a fair question, given the variety of views that those who call 
themselves libertarians have held. Many of them accept the so-called principle 
of alternative possibilities, but some do not. Some hold that no free action can 
be causally determined, whereas others insist that a properly formed character 
(together with other factors) can causally determine a free action under the right 
conditions. Beyond that, libertarians rarely, if ever, try to specify an informative 
(i.e., non-trivial) sufficient condition of free action; they usually seem content to 
specify a few necessary conditions. For my purposes in this paper, however, it is 
enough to have a very rough idea (if any at all) of what constitutes a libertarian 
and a compatibilist view. For I begin with a certain conception of divine freedom 
and then explore its implications for human freedom and for certain specific claims 
that those who call themselves libertarians and those who call themselves com-
patibilists have in fact made.
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The Supremely Perfect Cause of the Universe
I begin with the Anselmian conception of God, according to which God is 
a necessary being and such attributes as omnipotence, omniscience, per-
fect rationality, and loving-kindness are to be numbered among his es-
sential properties. According to this conception, then, God never makes a 
mistake concerning the best course of action, never acts upon a false belief, 
and never suffers from any illusion concerning the consequences of his 
own actions. With respect to the individual who is God, in other words, it 
is a necessary truth that this individual always knows which course of ac-
tion is the best, at least when there is a best course of action; it is also a nec-
essary truth that he always chooses whichever course of action he knows 
to be the best. So in that sense, his most important actions flow, as Spinoza 
and Leibniz also insisted, from the inner necessity of his own being or, 
more specifically, from the inner necessity of his own rationality. Once he 
has promised to do something, for example, that promise together with 
his essential attributes entails that he will in fact do it.
But even if God should always act from an inner necessity, at least with 
respect to the most important matters, he would still be, so I am assuming, 
the agent cause of his own actions. Yes, some philosophers have ques-
tioned whether the idea of a necessary being whose perfections are es-
sential properties is truly intelligible. Nor is it my intention here to defend 
the intelligibility of this idea with an argument of some kind or another. 
Assuming its intelligibility, however, my point is simply this: Because 
neither God’s existence nor any of his actions is the product of sufficient 
causes external to himself, he is the uncaused cause of every event he 
causes to occur; that, I presume, is utterly non-controversial. And because 
it is necessarily true that God never acts contrary to his own (correct) judg-
ment concerning the best course of action, there can be no question of his 
actions being wholly, or even partially, a matter of random chance. So 
even when God acts from an inner necessity, he remains the agent cause 
of his actions in just this sense: Each of them reflects his own perfectly 
rational judgment concerning the best course of action; none of them is the 
product of sufficient causes external to himself; and none of them is even 
partially a matter of random chance.
The Anselmian God, if he should exist, would also be, I shall argue 
below, the freest of all possible beings. Such a God would not, it is true, 
freely choose to be free, nor would the fact of his freedom be something 
that he brings about in himself or causes to be the case. But in that respect 
he would be no different from anyone else, for with one kind of excep-
tion the whole idea of someone freely choosing to be a free agent seems 
deeply incoherent. If, unlike God, I should have the power to destroy my 
freedom—through the use of drugs or by committing suicide, for exam-
ple—then perhaps one could view my freely choosing not to exercise such 
power as a case of freely choosing to remain free in the future. Still, even in 
a case such as this, the freedom expressed in my earliest free choices could 
not itself be a causal consequence of any prior free choices of my own. So 
even as no created person freely chooses to become a free agent—Sartre 
would say that we are condemned to freedom—neither does God freely 
choose to be the free agent that he is essentially.
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Wes Morriston on Divine Freedom
But if God’s very nature is such that he is incapable of error, moral failure, 
and the like, then how, one may wonder, can I nonetheless insist that he 
always does the right thing and always acts for the best freely? Wes Mor-
riston poses just such a question in a recent (and important) discussion, 
where he writes: “Since [the Anselmian] God is simply ‘stuck’ with his 
moral nature, he is not responsible either for it or for what follows from it, 
and is not therefore morally free.”6 In saying that God is “stuck” with his 
moral nature, Morriston means, I take it, that God never freely chose to 
have one nature rather than another.
As an illustration of his claim about God, Morriston asks us to imag-
ine that “a finite person,” whom he calls Bonnie Chance, comes into ex-
istence by random chance and does so with the following characteristic: 
“her nature prevents her from ever choosing what she sees to be less than 
the best.”7 Like God, then, Bonnie Chance “can’t help being good,” says 
Morriston, “because she is ‘stuck’ with a nature that prevents her from 
ever going wrong”;8 nor is her nature, which is the product of random 
chance, any more the product of external causes than the nature of God 
is the product of such causes. And although Morriston concedes that the 
existence of Bonnie Chance may be impossible (even as some might argue 
that the existence of God is impossible), he also insists that such an impos-
sibility is irrelevant to the point of his thought experiment, which is this: 
“The mere absence of external causes [in the case of God] is insufficient to 
guarantee his freedom, for the fact remains that he is just as determined by 
his nature as Bonnie is by her nature” (my italics).9 So, with respect to Bon-
nie Chance, Morriston writes: “Since it is Bonnie’s nature—and not Bonnie 
herself—that is responsible for her good behavior, we can only conclude 
that she is not acting freely when she acts for the best.”10 And with respect 
to God, he likewise writes: “So if God’s nature—rather than God—is the 
ultimate determiner of his moral choices, then I do not see why we should 
think that he is making them freely” (Morriston’s italics).11
Now I certainly agree with Morriston that the “mere absence of ex-
ternal causes,” particularly where such an absence is indistinguishable 
from random chance, is hardly a sufficient condition of the freedom that 
pertains to rational agents, as I shall here call it. But then, I know of no 
one who has claimed otherwise; most libertarians (including Morriston 
himself, I presume) would claim only that the absence of external causes 
is a necessary condition of the relevant freedom. So the more relevant ques-
tion, as I see it, is this: If you combine the absence of external causes with 
perfect rationality and the power to act in accordance with such rationali-
ty—or, in the case of human beings, the power to act in accordance with a 
6Morriston, “Is God Free? Reply to Wierenga,” p. 96.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Ibid., p. 97.
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reasonable and well informed judgment concerning the best course of 
action—why do you not then have something close to a sufficient condi-
tion of the free dom that pertains to rational agents? What further freedom 
could a rational agent possibly desire to have? In any event, however one 
answers such questions as these—and I shall return to a fuller discussion 
of them in the final section below—I have a two-fold objection to any sug-
gestion that Morriston’s example of Bonnie Chance counts against the 
freedom of God.
Consider first an important respect in which anything like the Anselmian 
God would be quite different from Bonnie Chance. I do not here refer to 
the obvious point that, whereas Bonnie exists contingently (assuming her 
existence to be possible at all), the Anselmian God would exist necessar-
ily; I refer instead to an ambiguity in the concept of nature, as Morriston 
evidently employs it, and to its bearing on the issue of an individual’s 
identity. The ambiguity is between the philosophical notion of an essence, 
a set of essential properties, and the more ordinary notion of a person’s 
accidental character traits, behavioral dispositions, and the like. A nature 
in the former sense, being a set of properties, is an abstract object and 
causally inert, so to speak; it neither causally determines nor exercises any 
causal influence over a person’s actions. But a nature in the latter sense is 
the sort of thing that could in principle figure into the causal explanation 
of an action—as, for instance, when a man’s honest character prevents 
him from telling a lie on some occasion or another. A specific character 
trait in that sense is not a property, conceived of as an abstract object, but 
the concrete instance of a property. In an effort to resolve this ambiguity, 
therefore, I shall henceforth use the term “nature” not as a synonym for 
the term “essence,” but as a term that signifies those concrete character 
traits and behavioral dispositions, however contingent they may be, that 
we ordinarily think of as constituting a person’s nature (as in a sinful na-
ture, for example) and as exerting a causal influence over, if not outright 
determining, some of our actions.
Accordingly, because Bonnie’s nature in the relevant sense includes 
many accidental character traits, behavioral dispositions, and the like, 
her specific nature in the actual world is hardly essential to her individ-
ual identity; and because she has a different nature in different possible 
worlds, we can coherently distinguish Bonnie herself, as Morriston does, 
from her nature (or at least from some of her accidental character traits 
even if not from all of them). But when Morriston speaks of God’s nature 
in the context of his argument concerning the freedom of God, he has in 
mind, I presume, an essence in the philosophical sense, a set of properties 
that God instantiates in every possible world in which he exists. So unlike 
Bonnie, who just happens to be, for example, perfectly loving, merciful, and 
just, the Anselmian God is essentially loving, merciful, and just; indeed, his 
essential goodness is just what raises a problem of divine freedom in the 
minds of many. But it also provides an effective counter to Morriston’s 
claim that “God’s nature—rather than God—is the ultimate determiner of 
his moral choices.” For that claim seems to make no coherent sense at 
all in the present context. If we think of God’s nature as a causally inert 
abstract object, then it has no more causal influence over his actions than 
any other abstract object does; and if we think of God’s nature, no less 
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than God himself, as the concrete instantiation of his essence, then God is 
clearly identical with his nature. In deciding to create, for example, it was 
God himself, and nothing other than God, who was the agent cause of the 
heavens and the earth.12
Consider next the example of Bonnie Chance more closely. Before we can 
even begin to evaluate Morriston’s claim that “it is Bonnie’s nature—and 
not Bonnie herself—that is [causally?] responsible for her good behavior,” 
we must first ask: Just who (or what) is Bonnie herself (the individual that 
Morriston contrasts with Bonnie’s nature)? Or, to put the question another 
way: Just what is it that the name “Bonnie Chance” supposedly signifies if 
the individual named is to be distinguished from all of the character traits, 
behavioral dispositions, desires, and attitudes that, however contingent 
they may be, we ordinarily associate with a person’s nature? Does “Bon-
nie Chance” name anything beyond a characterless subject of predication? 
If not, then I certainly agree that a characterless subject of predication does 
not act in the world and does not, in particular, act freely.13 But suppose 
we think of Bonnie herself as a particular person, a rational agent whose 
cognitive faculties work properly, whose judgments concerning the best 
course of action are reliable, and whose true beliefs are such that she holds 
them for the right sorts of reasons.14 So conceived, I see no reason to deny 
that Bonnie, like God, fits the very paradigm of someone who acts freely. 
For even if a rational agent should pop into existence by random chance, 
12At the end of his article, Morriston acknowledges that his assumption “that 
God (like Bonnie) is distinct from his nature [or essence] . . . is controversial”; he 
then goes on to make the intriguing suggestion that a doctrine of divine simplic-
ity, assuming it to be coherent, can solve the problem of divine freedom because, 
according to that doctrine, “God is identical to God’s nature” (p. 98). But this does 
not, it seems to me, get at the critical issue. For the critical issue is not whether God 
is identical to some abstract object, namely, a set of properties; it is instead whether 
God, unlike Bonnie Chance, is identical to an individual G such that it is logically 
impossible that G should have been less than perfectly good. If God is identical to 
G, then we cannot coherently distinguish God himself from the ultimate springs 
of his moral actions. And although the simplicity doctrine likewise entails that we 
cannot distinguish God himself from the ultimate springs of his moral actions, it is 
hardly necessary for such a view.
13I should perhaps emphasize here that I am not attributing to Morriston the 
view that “Bonnie Chance” names nothing more than a characterless subject of 
predication. My point is simply that we need a clear conception of just who Bon-
nie herself is (in contrast to Bonnie’s nature) before we can evaluate the claim that 
Bonnie’s nature, and not Bonnie herself, determines her good actions. 
14Here I gloss over a host of difficulties, as I see them, in the example of Bonnie 
Chance. Are we to suppose, for example, that Bonnie is omniscient from the time 
that she pops into existence by chance? That is, does she come into being already 
knowing all the laws of nature, everything about the state of the universe at the 
time of her emergence, and all the causal consequences of all possible actions? If 
so, then from whence comes her knowledge? Unlike God, she does not simply 
know the nature of the things that she herself has made or designed; unlike ordi-
nary human beings, she does not acquire her knowledge of how things work from 
experience; and unlike a created being with implanted or innate knowledge, she is 
in no way a recipient of her knowledge. If she is not omniscient, however, then one 
wonders how her nature alone could prevent her from ever going wrong.
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as we are here imagining, it would nonetheless be, by hypothesis, a ratio-
nal agent once it came into being. Nor would the fact that its existence is 
the product of chance carry any implication that its actions, subsequent to 
its having come into existence, are the product of chance. To the contrary, 
if Bonnie herself qualifies as a rational agent, then the ultimate expla nation 
for her actions, at least in cases where she sees the best course of action 
clearly, lies in her own practical reason and her own rational judgment con-
cerning the best course of action.15 Accordingly, even as the Anselmian 
God would be a rational agent who exists necessarily and initiates his own 
actions, so Bonnie Chance would be a rational agent who sprang into exis-
tence by random chance and then began initiating her own actions. In that 
respect, Bonnie’s actions, no less than God’s, would qualify as legitimate 
instances of agent causation and also legitimate instances, so it seems to 
me, of free action.16
Now even many libertarian philosophers—Robert Kane and Laura Ek-
strom, for example17—are suspicious of appeals to agent causation, and 
for good reason. For when agency theorists appeal to agent causation 
in an effort to distinguish a free choice, uncaused by any events, from 
random chance, they too often merely deepen the very mystery that they 
are trying to explain away. Suppose that yesterday I had a non-decisive 
reason R to do A and a non-decisive reason R* to refrain from A, and sup-
pose that, after deliberating for a while, I made the choice, uncaused by 
any events, to do A in a context in which refraining from A was likewise 
causally possible. If this is a context, as some libertarians would have it, 
in which I categorically could have chosen otherwise, the well-known ob-
jection is that such a choice would in the end be indistinguishable from 
a random selection between alternatives. For what other than random 
15According to Morriston in a personal correspondence, Bonnie’s practical rea-
son and reliable judgments concerning the best course of action constitute “the 
proximate explanation [of her actions], not the ultimate one.” But here is why I re-
gard this proximate explanation of her actions to be the ultimate explanation as 
well. The chance instantiation of Bonnie’s essence, if it should occur, would entail 
that her instantiation (or coming into being) has no explanation at all. Given, how-
ever, that she comes into being without explanation as a perfectly rational agent, 
one whose judgments concerning the best course of action are utterly reliable, the 
only explanation (and thus the ultimate explanation) of her actions lies in the de-
liverances of her reliable practical reason. So even though her existence remains an 
unexplained mystery, her actions, once she comes into being, are not.
16At this point one might wonder about Suzie Determined, whose existence and 
perfectly rational nature are, let us suppose, both causally determined. Could we 
say the same thing about her? Could we say, to be specific, that Suzie’s actions, 
no less than God’s, would qualify as genuinely free actions? Here too, I believe, it 
matters not how Suzie Determined comes into being, provided that, once she does 
come into being, her own reasoning powers control her actions in the right sort 
of way. But in the end we must also confront the issue of what is possible. Is it 
genuinely possible for Suzie’s reasoning powers to determine her own actions and 
to control them properly in a fully deterministic universe? For more on that issue, 
see the final section below.
17See Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) and Laura Ekstrom, Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boul-
der, CO: Westview Press, 2000).
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chance might “explain” why I acted from R and chose to do A when I 
categorically could have acted from R* and have chosen to refrain from A? 
Granted, whichever choice I had made, whether I had chosen to do A or 
had chosen to refrain from A, that choice would have been distinguishable 
from chance in the sense that I, the agent, would have acted for a reason. 
But what nonetheless remains unexplained, whether properly so or not, is 
why I should have acted from R and have chosen to do A when I categori-
cally could have acted from R* and have chosen to refrain from A; in that 
respect, it is hard to see why my having chosen to do A rather than having 
chosen to refrain from A was not the product of random chance or at least 
the product of random elements in some decision making process. Nor 
do I see how one can remove the apparent arbitrariness here simply by 
calling this an instance of agent causation, which does nothing to remove 
the mystery.18
It seems to me, therefore, that an appeal to agent causation does little 
to address the worry of many compatibilists (and even some libertarians) 
that the very existence of alternatives, each being causally possible, al-
ready implies a degree of randomness, chance, or arbitrariness. But inso-
far as the God of Anselm, Spinoza, and Leibniz has decisive reasons for his 
most important actions,19 these actions are in no way the product of chance 
and in no way a random selection between alternatives. So, because God 
provides the clearest example of a rational agent whose perfectly rational 
actions are the product of neither external manipulation, on the one hand, 
nor random chance, on the other, he also provides the clearest example of 
both agent causation and the freedom that pertains to rational agents.
William Rowe and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
According to Morriston, as we have just seen, the Anselmian God, who of 
necessity always acts for the best, does not act freely because he is “stuck” 
with a moral nature that prevents him from doing otherwise. So Morriston 
18The best defense of this objection is, in my opinion, Peter van Inwagen’s. See 
Part 2 of “Free Will Remains a Mystery” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. 
Robert Kane (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 167–175.
19As an anonymous referee very properly pointed out, I here sidestep “entirely 
the question of whether God’s decision to create this world (or something very 
like it) is something for which he has decisive reasons.” Although it is by no means 
essential to my thesis here, my own view, for what it is worth, is that God does 
indeed have decisive reasons for creating a universe that includes people of some 
kind or another; hence, it is necessarily true, I believe, that he creates such a uni-
verse. For two reasons, however, one need have no fear of fatalism at this point: 
First, its being necessarily true that God creates a universe with people of some 
kind or another is quite consistent with its being a contingent fact, with respect 
to each created person x, that God creates x. And second, even if, for each created 
person x, it is indeed necessarily true that God creates x, we can still avoid fatal-
ism in the way I pointed out in “On the Divine Nature and the Nature of Divine 
Freedom.” For if it is also necessarily true that God creates a universe in which 
indeterminism and chance have an important role to play in the lives of created 
persons, then that would suffice not only for the existence of contingent facts about 
the created universe, but also for the existence of contingent facts about God. See 
pp. 15–16 of the above-mentioned article.
386 Faith and Philosophy
seems clearly committed to the much-discussed principle of alternative 
possibilities: the principle that a person chooses freely in a given context 
only if the person categorically could have chosen otherwise in the same 
context. William Rowe likewise insists that freedom implies “an impor-
tant kind of control over the future, limited as that control may be. Such 
control consists in freedom to do otherwise, the power we possess to make 
any one of two or more alternative paths into the future the path we shall 
actually follow” (Rowe’s italics).20 So, because it is logically impossible 
that God should ever choose less than the best, at least where there is a 
best course of action, Rowe, like Morriston, denies that God chooses the 
best course of action freely.
Even in the case of human beings, however, the so-called principle of 
alternative possibilities is quite mistaken, I believe, if it is understood to 
include the following faulty assumption:
(FA) A person S does A freely in a set of circumstances C only if in C 
it is also psychologically possible for S to refrain from A.
The first difficulty with (FA) is that it fails to account for cases in which 
choosing otherwise would be an instance of choosing irrationally. In a 
case such as that, why should acting freely (or why should the freedom 
that pertains to rational agents) require the psychological possibility of 
choosing otherwise? In fact, why not regard the power to choose irratio-
nally as itself incompatible with a fully realized freedom? Suppose that in a 
moment of delusion a schizophrenic young man, standing in the kitchen 
with a butcher knife in his hand, should suddenly come to believe that his 
loving mother is a sinister invader from space and not really his mother at 
all. Suppose further that the young man’s delusion should create for him a 
context of alternative possibilities that would not have existed apart from 
it; it creates, in other words, a context in which he finds it psychologically 
possible to slash his mother to death as well as psychologically possible 
to refrain from killing her (after all, other sinister invaders could easily 
turn him into their next meal as a punishment for killing his mother!). 
So whichever decision he makes, his irrational deliberation, as chancy as 
such things can be, could have produced the contrary choice under the 
same initial conditions. Here, at least, the presence of alternative possibili-
ties seems incompatible with genuine freedom precisely because it entails 
a degree of irrationality that is itself incompatible with freedom. In such a 
context, I contend, a fully realized freedom not only does not require, but 
actually precludes, the psychological possibility of choosing otherwise.
A second difficulty with (FA) is that, unless restricted in some way, this 
principle is also incompatible with too many ordinary paradigms of free 
action, such as the loving mother who cares for her children and the hon-
est banker who refuses a bribe. Some libertarians have thus rejected these 
paradigms altogether and have even concluded, as Peter van Inwagen 
once did, that “we have precious little free will.”21 For consider a young 
mother, full of love for her baby, who finds it utterly unthinkable (and 
20William Rowe, Can God Be Free?, p. 55.
21See Peter van Inwagen, “When is the Will Free?” Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 
3: Philosophy of Mind and Action (1989), p. 414.
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therefore psychologically impossible) to torture her baby, or even just to 
abandon it somewhere. According to (FA), such a loving mother does not 
care for her child freely. But I see no compelling reason to suppose that a 
rational agent would lose her freedom at the very instant that she judges 
it overwhelmingly important to act in one way rather than in another. If 
no one can act freely in a context where the only available alternative to 
some action seems unthinkable or utterly indefensible, then why should 
any rational agent prize or value freedom at all?
It is my contention, then, that libertarians ought to reject (FA).22 Accord-
ing to William Rowe, however, “Examples in support of this principle are 
not difficult to come by,” and he goes on to give the following example:
If a young child is exposed to electric shock every time he fails to 
say ‘Yes sir!’ when his teacher orders him to do something, it even-
tually will be psychologically impossible for the child to refrain from 
saying ‘Yes sir!’ on hearing an order from his teacher. No one who 
has command of the language, and knowing the circumstances just 
described, is likely to insist that when the child, subsequent to this 
coercive conditioning, says ‘Yes sir!’ in response to the teacher’s com-
mand, nevertheless freely utters that response.23
After setting forth his example, Rowe then asks: “how on earth can Talbott 
maintain that the child freely says ‘Yes sir!’ in those circumstances . . . ?”24 
The answer, of course, is that I would never dream of making such a claim, 
and neither would a sophisticated compatibilist.
Observe first that, contrary to what Rowe suggests, his example of co-
ercive conditioning offers no support at all for the general claim in (FA); 
at best it supports the more specific claim that under certain conditions the 
psychological impossibility of acting otherwise is incompatible with free-
dom. In a companion to the article that Rowe criticizes,25 I thus distin-
guished between two very different kinds of cases: those where one finds 
it psychologically impossible to act in accordance with one’s own judgment 
concerning the best course of action, and those where one finds it psycho-
logically impossible to act contrary to such a judgment. In the first kind of 
22I agree wholeheartedly, therefore, with Edward Wierenga who asks: “Why has 
it proven so difficult to find an acceptable statement of the principle” of alternative 
possibilities? Wierenga goes on to suggest that “the intuitive use of the principle 
is as a test, an approximate test, for the presence of the wrong sort of antecedent 
conditions, the ones that would render an action unfree. It is difficult to state ex-
actly because it is only a rough test. If this is right, then it doesn’t matter that God 
fails the test posed by one’s preferred principle of alternative possibilities. We can 
judge that actions proceeding from his own divine nature are free, and thus we 
do not need to employ a detector for the sorts of antecedent conditions which, if 
present in human agents, preclude their acting freely.” (See Edward Wierenga, 
“Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom,” Philosophical Books 48 [2007], p. 210.)
23William Rowe, Can God Be Free?, pp. 143–144.
24Ibid., p. 144.
25See Thomas Talbott, “On Free Agency and the Concept of Power,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1988), pp. 241–254.
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case, the relevant psychological impossibility is indeed incompatible with 
freedom, as the example of certain alcoholics and drug addicts illustrates 
nicely. For it may happen that an alcoholic, having judged it best to refuse 
another drink, nonetheless finds it psychologically impossible to do so; 
and if that should happen, then the alcoholic’s will would be in a kind of 
bondage to an addiction or perhaps to the temporary euphoria that alco-
hol can sometimes induce. In the second kind of case, however, the rel-
evant psychological impossibility is not always, so I argued, incompatible 
with freedom. Quite the contrary. When a rational agent finds an action (or 
inaction) to be utterly unthinkable, utterly indefensible, and, for that very 
reason, psychologically impossible, this psychological impossibility may 
be, provided that the relevant judgments are both reasonable and well 
informed, just what true freedom requires.
So my own view, which I first expressed (rather confusedly) back in 
1988, includes an asymmetry thesis not altogether unlike the one that Su-
san Wolf defends, but with one important difference. According to Wolf’s 
Reason View, moral responsibility as well as the freedom that moral re-
sponsibility presupposes “depends upon the ability to act in accordance 
with the True and the Good”; it requires, in other words, that one have 
the power to do the right thing for the right reasons. But it does not re-
quire the psychological possibility that one might in fact act wrongly or 
fail to do the right thing for the right reasons.26 My own asymmetry thesis, 
however, requires only that one have the power to follow one’s own fal-
lible judgment concerning the best course of action; it does not require that 
one’s fallible judgment be correct, nor does it require, particularly in cases 
where the agent remains ignorant of pertinent matters (such as the actual 
consequences of a given action or the true character of his or her own in-
terests), the psychological possibility of the agent actually doing the right 
thing (assuming there to be a right thing) for the right reasons.27 Wolf and 
I nonetheless agree concerning this: The psychological possibility of acting 
in an utterly irrational way, far from enhancing the freedom of a rational 
agent, might even undermine such freedom altogether.28
26According to Wolf, “The Reason View is thus committed to the curious claim 
that being psychologically determined to perform good actions is compatible with 
deserving praise for them, but that being psychologically determined to perform 
bad actions is not compatible with deserving blame” (see Susan Wolf, Freedom 
Within Reason [New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990], p. 79). But 
because the Christian religion requires, in my opinion, that we give up “the blame 
game” altogether and abandon the whole idea of intrinsic desert, it also requires 
that we rethink the concept of moral responsibility accordingly. I have therefore 
restricted my attention here to the concept of freedom. 
27So if a Mafia boss, for example, should qualify as a rational agent and should 
(mistakenly) judge it best, all things considered, to do something immoral, such as 
ordering the assassination of a competitor, the Mafia boss might nonetheless issue 
the order freely, in my view, even if the following should be true: It is psychologi-
cally impossible, at the time of his issuing the immoral order, that he should have 
refrained from issuing it.
28Concerning “the ability to choose and to act independently of all, even all 
rational, bases,” Wolf thus insists that “responsibility [and therefore freedom] re-
quires something more limited than that, namely, the ability to choose and to act 
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A Rejoinder to Rowe
Although I flatly reject the so-called principle of alternative possibilities 
when interpreted as (FA), Rowe thinks it a mistake to do so, and he diag-
noses my supposed error in the following way: “Talbott makes the mistake 
of confusing a ‘free act’ with an act for which an agent is, at best, deriva-
tively ‘morally responsible.’”29 The distinction is important and easy to 
illustrate. Rowe himself cites the example of Odysseus, who “orders his 
men to tie him to the mast so that at the time he hears” the voices of the 
sirens “he will be unable to yield to the temptation to follow the sirens’ 
call.”30 Accordingly, even as a drunk driver may be blamable, on account 
of prior choices, for an accident he was later unable to avoid, so Odysseus, 
having given his order, may be praiseworthy for his inability to respond 
to the sirens’ call after being tied to the mast. Still, as Rowe points out 
correctly, “It is simply a mistake to think that when he hears the sirens’ 
song Odysseus ‘freely refrains’ from responding.”31 Instead, he has a kind 
of “derivative responsibility,” as Rowe calls it, for having freely chosen to 
remove his own freedom in an effort to ensure that he would not act upon 
his moral weaknesses.
So why does Rowe attribute such an elementary mistake (or confusion) 
to me? Here is a clue. Concerning a man who could never bring himself to 
torture the wife he genuinely loves, Rowe suggests that “the impossibility 
of his presently wanting to torture his wife is the result of his earlier free 
decision to spend his life with her, a decision that resulted in his coming 
to love her in a way that makes it psychologically impossible for him to 
want to torture her.”32 Rowe thus countenances the idea that the man may 
have, on account of his prior free choices, a kind of derivative responsibil-
ity for the relevant psychological impossibility and may, in that sense, be 
praiseworthy for it; Rowe then concludes that I have simply confused the 
concept of freedom with this kind of derivative responsibility.
Of course, if I have indeed fallen into confusion at this point, then so 
have a number of other libertarian philosophers. According to James F. 
Sennett, for example, “A character that is libertarian freely chosen is the 
only kind of character that can determine compatibilist free choices.”33 
And Robert Kane likewise writes: “Agents with free will . . . must be such 
that they could have done otherwise on some occasions of their life histo-
ries with respect to some character- or motive-forming acts by which they 
make themselves into the kinds of persons they are.”34 Such philosophers 
would no doubt see important differences between Rowe’s example of 
in accordance with Reason, that is, the ability to choose and to act in accordance 
with what reasons there are” (Freedom Within Reason, p. 96).
29Rowe, Can God Be Free?, p. 145.
30Ibid., p. 143.
31Ibid., p. 145.
32Ibid.
33James F. Sennett, “Is there Freedom in Heaven?” Faith and Philosophy, 16 
(1999), p. 74.
34Kane, The Significance of Free Will, p. 72.
390 Faith and Philosophy
Odysseus, where being tied to the mast merely protected him from his 
own character weaknesses, and cases where one’s choices supposedly 
shape one’s own character in a direction that henceforth makes certain ac-
tions psychologically impossible. But beyond that, I see no reason to sup-
pose that our ordinary paradigms of free action, as I have called them, in 
any way rest upon a confusion between free action, on the one hand, and a 
kind of derivative responsibility, on the other. Indeed, with a few notable 
exceptions, such as the Odysseus example above, where the consequences 
of someone’s choices are both immediate and quite foreseeable, the whole 
idea of derivative responsibility seems to me utterly problematic. For as 
Rowe himself points out, “There are long range causal consequences of our 
free acts that are not themselves freely chosen or consciously foreseen.”35 
And as I have elsewhere expressed a similar point:
But the problem is that actions too often have unexpected conse-
quences in our lives. One person lies and cheats in pursuit of wealth 
and fame, only to discover that the result is emptiness and misery; 
and the circumstances surrounding this discovery may causally de-
termine (even compel) a life transformation. Another may sincerely 
cultivate moral integrity and inadvertently produce some of the 
worst character traits: moral rigidity, self-righteousness, and a lack 
of compassion.36
Accordingly, in many cases where our immediate desires, beliefs, and 
the like determine our actions, the idea that we have a kind of derivative 
responsibility for these actions, grounded in our past choices, seems to 
me far more problematic than the idea that we have simply acted freely. 
Consider again the loving mother who cares for her child freely, so I claim, 
despite the psychological impossibility of doing otherwise. As far as we 
know, she may never have chosen, at least not in any explicit way, the de-
sires, motherly instincts, and beliefs that presently determine her actions; 
and even if some undetermined choices had influenced some of these 
causal factors, these influences may not have been foreseeable at all. So 
contrary to what Rowe supposes, I would appeal to something in the pres-
ent, not to the woman’s past choices, in an effort to explain her freedom in 
the matter of caring for her child.
How, then, would I account for her freedom? I would do so by point-
ing to an important respect in which she differs from the young boy who 
is coercively conditioned into uttering the words “Yes sir!” For nothing 
in Rowe’s description of the latter case suggests that the boy has ever re-
flected on his own behavior or has made any judgment at all, much less a 
reasonable and well informed one, concerning the wisest course of action 
35Rowe, Can God Be Free?, p. 145.
36“Free Choice and Moral Character: A Difficulty for Libertarians,” presented at 
the Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in April, 
2003. In an extremely important essay, Manuel Vargas likewise notes that “even 
freely chosen features of our lives and ourselves can, because of our epistemic 
limitations, yield unanticipated consequences” (“The Trouble with Tracing,” Mid-
west Studies in Philosophy xxix (2005), p. 282).
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in the matter of uttering the words “Yes sir!” in response to the teacher’s 
commands. To the contrary, the boy appears to utter these words as auto-
matically as Pavlov’s dog salivated whenever it heard a certain bell ring-
ing. So our loving mother differs from the boy in just this respect: Unlike 
the boy, she has a belief, for which she could provide reasons (if asked), 
concerning what is best, all things considered, in the matter of whether 
or not to care for her baby. Her belief also rests upon her own assessment 
of the evidence for a host of matters, such as the probable consequences 
of various actions and the conditions of her own happiness as well as that 
of her baby. And finally, her belief is, let us suppose, both reasonable and 
as well informed as can be expected. Given these important differences 
between the two cases, I fail to see how Rowe’s example of coercive con-
ditioning is even relevant to the case of the mother who finds it utterly 
unthinkable to abandon her child.
So let us now alter Rowe’s example just a bit. Let us suppose that, as 
a developing rational agent, the boy in Rowe’s example should become 
acutely aware of what his teachers had done to him in the matter of sub-
jecting him to electric shocks, that he should also become aware of an 
elaborate plot to expose these disgraceful techniques to the public, that 
(when asked to do so) he joins with the conspirators because he desper-
ately wants their plot to succeed, and that the success of this plot requires 
that he “fake it” for several weeks and continue to say “Yes sir!” in re-
sponse to every command from his teacher (sort of like Paul Newman 
repeatedly saying “Yes boss” in the film Cool Hand Luke). For the sake of 
this thought experiment, let us also adopt two additional assumptions: 
First, given the precise circumstances in which he was asked to join with 
the conspirators, there was no chance that the boy would refuse to do so. 
For just as the beliefs and desires of a drowning man who desperately 
wants to live may determine that he will grasp the lifeline that someone 
tosses to him, so the beliefs and desires of the boy in our revised example 
suffice to determine, let us suppose, that he will join with the conspirators. 
Second, when the boy first joins with the conspirators, his responses to his 
teacher’s commands are over-determined in this sense: Even if he did not 
have this new reason for saying “Yes sir!” in the relevant circumstances, 
his conditioning would have taken over and he would have uttered these 
words nonetheless. But after a few days, he finds that his prior condition-
ing begins to lose its power over him; indeed, he begins to feel utterly 
free in this matter. Still, at no time is it psychologically possible for him 
not to utter the words “Yes sir!” in the relevant circumstances. For by the 
time that his prior conditioning loses its power over him, he already has a 
compelling reason to pretend that it had not lost its power over him. After 
all, he desperately wants the plot to succeed, as I said, and he is therefore 
unwilling to do anything that might sabotage it.
Now, concerning his own example of coercive conditioning, Rowe 
writes: “No one who has command of the language . . . is likely to in-
sist that when the child . . . says “Yes sir!” in response to his teacher’s 
command, the child, nevertheless, ‘freely’ utters that response.”37 That is 
correct, which is also why such examples do little to further the dispute 
37Rowe, Can God Be Free?, p. 144.
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between compatibilists and incompatibilists. But would Rowe say the 
same thing about the boy in my revision of his example? I, at least, would 
not, and I strongly suspect that most ordinary people with a good com-
mand of the language would conclude that the boy in my revised example 
comes to utter the words “Yes sir!” quite freely, despite the psychological 
impossibility of his acting otherwise.
The Freedom that Pertains to Rational Agents
It is almost a truism, I suppose, that the concept of rationality, as employed 
in ordinary moral and legal contexts, is an essential part of the concept of 
freedom, particularly as the latter applies to rational agents. But unlike God 
(and perhaps even Bonnie Chance), ordinary human beings are neither 
perfectly rational nor all knowing; instead, their rationality and the extent 
of their knowledge are both limited and matters of degree. Still, despite 
the enormous difference between God’s perfect rationality, as tradition-
ally understood, and our more limited rationality, the freedom of God 
nonetheless represents the ideal, I have suggested, for a rational agent. 
Accordingly, even as God acts freely whenever his perfectly rational and 
wise judgments determine his actions, so we act freely whenever our 
more limited understanding, as expressed through reasonable judgments 
concerning the best course of action, determines our actions. All of which 
points, I suggest, to a sufficient condition for the freedom of any rational 
agent, whether it be a perfectly rational supreme being or a less than per-
fectly rational human being.
So let us say, as a sort of rough characterization, that an action A is 
available to an agent S in a set of circumstances C provided that S would 
successfully do A if S should undertake to do so. In that respect, my own 
available actions right now include checking my e-mail from the computer 
on which I am now typing, but they do not include flying like a bird. In 
a locked jail cell, one’s available actions might include walking from one 
side of the cell to another, but might not include opening the door and 
leaving the cell. Beyond that, however, an action might be available in the 
specified sense even when an agent finds it psychologically impossible 
to undertake doing it—as the loving mother who finds it psychologically 
impossible to torture to death her newborn baby illustrates nicely. For 
even though she could not so much as undertake doing something that 
horrendous, she would nonetheless do it successfully if she should un-
dertake to do so.38 Accordingly, where two or more actions are, in that 
sense, available to S in C, I propose the following sufficient condition of 
S’s acting freely in C:
38Clearly, then, one should not object to my conditional analysis of an available 
action on the ground that it includes actions that an agent is incapable of undertak-
ing. For the whole point of such an analysis is to include such actions. Neither 
should one think of an available action as an epistemically possible alternative or 
as one of the live options from which an agent chooses. For the act of torturing her 
beloved baby is in no way a live option for our loving mother and may not even be 
epistemically possible (at least not if she knows herself well enough to know that 
such a horrendous act would be psychologically impossible for her). 
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(SCF) S does A freely in C if the following conditions obtain: (i) S is ra-
tional enough to make reasonable judgments concerning which 
of the available actions in C is, all things considered, the best 
thing to do in C, (ii) S in fact makes a reasonable judgment that A 
is, all things considered, the best thing to do in C, and (iii) S does 
A in C for the very reason that S reasonably believes it to be the 
best thing to do in C.39
When I say that someone “is rational enough to make reasonable judg-
ments” concerning the best course of action, I assume that a minimal de-
gree of rationality is also a necessary condition of the relevant freedom. 
But as with borderline cases in general, it is probably impossible to say 
exactly when a maturing child, let us say, becomes rational enough to 
advance above the relevant threshold or when someone suffering from 
age-related dementia sinks below that threshold. In the case of a woman 
suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, for example, there need be no exact 
instant at which her ever-diminishing rationality removes the last shred of 
her remaining freedom; it is enough that at some point she has clearly lost 
the ability to make reasonable judgments concerning the best course of 
action and has therefore lost the ability to act freely. Suffice it to say, there-
fore, that the minimal degree of rationality required includes an ability 
to draw reasonable inferences from experience, to reflect intelligently on 
one’s own attitudes, desires, and motives, and to learn important lessons 
from the consequences of one’s actions.
If (SCF) is sound, as I believe it is, then many libertarians are simply 
mistaken on the issue of alternative possibilities. For only in cases where 
one experiences weakness of will, that is, only in cases where one fails to 
follow one’s own judgment concerning the best course of action does 
freedom require the psychological possibility of acting otherwise. In the 
case of God, moreover, freedom does not even require the logical possibil-
ity of acting otherwise. So if God’s freedom is the ideal freedom and our 
freedom is a reflection of his, as I am here assuming, then in no way does 
freedom require a robust set of alternative possibilities; it requires instead 
the kind of independence that rational deliberation and, in particular, a ra-
tional selection between alternatives implies. In the case of God’s supreme 
rationality, the relevant independence is an absolute causal independence, 
because none of God’s rational judgments is the product of external ma-
nipulation or even external sufficient causes. But unlike God, who exists 
necessarily, and unlike Bonnie Chance, who supposedly pops into exis-
tence by sheer chance as a fully mature and fully rational being, the rest 
of us are, at least in part, the product of external causes—the causes of our 
own birth, for example. We also emerge as newborn babies with only the 
potential, not yet fully realized, of developing into a reasoning adult. So 
the question inevitably arises: Just how should we construe the indepen-
dence that ordinary human freedom requires?
39For some similar sufficient conditions, see Alfred R. Mele, Free Will and Luck 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 200–201. Common to 
all of Mele’s sufficient conditions, tweaked differently for different purposes, as 
well as to my own is the idea that an agent acts freely when the agent acts “on the 
basis of a rationally formed deliberative judgment that it would be best to do A.”
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Now a theistically inclined libertarian will no doubt insist that even 
as God’s ideal freedom includes an absolute causal independence, so our 
more limited freedom requires at least a degree of causal independence. 
It requires, in other words, that we be something more than a mere exten-
sion of either the physical universe or even God himself. And that sug-
gests the following necessary condition of acting freely:
(NCF) A person S does A freely only if no condition or set of conditions 
external to S is causally sufficient for S’s doing A.
Unfortunately, I have no rigorous criterion for distinguishing between a 
sufficient cause that is, and one that is not, external to S. For present pur-
poses, however, I shall simply assume that S’s desires, attitudes, beliefs, 
and judgments are internal (and therefore not external) to S; I shall also as-
sume that if a sufficient cause of S’s doing A should lie either in the distant 
past before S was born or in eternity itself, then that sufficient cause would 
be external to S. So if S’s own desires, beliefs, and judgments should be 
causally sufficient for S’s doing A in a given context, this would not, given 
just that information, violate the putative necessary condition of freedom 
set forth in (NCF). But if these very desires, beliefs, and judgments should 
also be the product of sufficient causes that lie in the distant past before S 
was even born, this would indeed violate the putative necessary condition 
set forth in (NCF).
Still, even with respect to (NCF), a compatibilist, whether theistically 
inclined or not, might register the following complaint: If (SCF) is a suf-
ficient condition of freedom, as I have suggested, then anyone who meets 
this condition has indeed acted freely. It should make no difference to 
one’s freedom, therefore, whether or not determinism is true. Or to put it 
another way: If (SCF) does not obviously entail (NCF), why regard (NCF) 
as a necessary condition of the freedom that pertains to rational agents? 
The issue that such a question raises is whether it is genuinely possible to 
satisfy (SCF), our sufficient condition of acting freely, in a fully determin-
istic universe. If this should be possible—that is, if rational deliberation 
should be possible in a universe in which all of our present thoughts and 
beliefs are the product of sufficient causes that already existed back in 1500 
A.D.—then the freedom that pertains to rational agents would be possible 
in such a universe as well; and if the latter should be possible, then the 
right kind of determinism should be quite distinguishable, at least in prin-
ciple, from freedom-removing manipulation.40 But if rational deliberation 
should not be possible in such a universe, then neither would the relevant 
freedom be possible in such a universe. In adopting (SCF), therefore, we 
have effectively transformed the question of whether freedom is possible 
in a fully deterministic universe into the question of whether rational de-
40What might it even mean to say, for example, that a rational agent has been 
manipulated into believing a true proposition and into believing it for the right 
sort of reasons? Suppose that God (or a scientist working with a zygote, for that 
matter) should produce a rational agent S and put S in a situation where S experi-
ences fire and learns that fire can burn and cause severe pain. So long as S assesses 
the evidence properly and follows the evidence where it leads, thereby holding 
the relevant belief for the right sorts of reasons, the idea that S has been subject to 
rationality-removing manipulation seems flatly self-contradictory.
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liberation is itself possible in such a universe. It seems to me, moreover, 
that libertarians and compatibilists should both accept (SCF), even as they 
continue to argue about (NCF). That would also have the consequence of 
bringing these two warring camps a bit closer together.
Be that as it may, the question of whether rational deliberation is pos-
sible in a fully deterministic universe, if we should try to pursue it any 
farther here, would take us far beyond the scope of this paper (and far 
beyond anything illuminating that I might have to contribute). Suffice it 
to say that, according to a few philosophers at least, the very appearance 
of rationality would be an illusion in a fully deterministic universe. For 
even as libertarians have typically argued that no free action in the pres-
ent could be the product of sufficient causes lying in the distant past, so a 
few philosophers have argued that no rational belief in the present could 
be the product of such causes either.41 The basic idea here is that reason 
must somehow proceed on its own in a difficult to specify sense. Insofar 
as our reasoning powers exercise the right kind of control over both our 
beliefs about the universe and our actions in it, these beliefs and actions 
are neither the product of external sufficient causes, such as might have 
existed before we were even born, nor the product of random chance. But 
insofar as our reasoning powers fail to exercise the right kind of control 
over our beliefs and actions, the explanation for this failure will typically 
lie either in external causes (such as manipulation or brainwashing), or 
in the wrong kind of internal causes (such as ignorance, distraction, or 
forgetfulness), or perhaps even in random chance.
So herein lies, I believe, the real issue between libertarians and com-
patibilists; the real issue is (or ought to be) the nature of the rationality 
that freedom requires and whether reasonable beliefs concerning the best 
course of action are genuinely possible in a fully deterministic universe. 
Put it this way: The freedom that pertains to rational agents is possible in 
a fully deterministic universe if, and only if, the rationality that freedom 
requires is itself possible in such a universe.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have contended that a supremely perfect God, if one 
should exist as traditionally conceived, would be the freest of all possible 
beings as well as provide the clearest and most accurate example of agent 
causation. It also stands to reason that God’s freedom would represent the 
ideal freedom for any rational agent and that God would therefore value 
the kind of freedom that he possesses more highly than he would any 
41For an excellent defense of this basic idea, one that appeared in the middle of 
the last century, see Warner Wick, “Truth’s Debt to Freedom,” Mind Vol. LXXIII 
(October, 1964), pp. 527–537. Alvin Plantinga’s argument against naturalism (see 
Warrant and Proper Function [New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993], chaps. 11 and 12) and William Hasker’s explanation of why (in his opinion) 
the physical cannot be closed (see The Emergent Self, pp. 58–80) also appear to rest 
upon the idea that rational belief could not exist in a closed system of blind physi-
cal causes, although neither argument would rule out certain kinds of theological 
determinism. See also J. R Lucas’s argument against determinism in The Freedom of 
the Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 114–134.
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lesser kind.42 So it is probably best, I have suggested, to think of human 
freedom as a matter of degree. We all start out as small children, and in 
the beginning we are neither rational agents, nor free agents, nor agent 
causes of our own actions, however undetermined some of them might 
be. But as we mature, as our cognitive faculties continue to develop, and 
as we acquire first an ability to control the movements of our body and 
later a more sophisticated ability to reflect upon, and to make decisions 
about, our own behavior, our capacity for free action likewise evolves. 
Insofar as we come to exercise rational control over our actions, we also 
become, in a perfectly ordinary sense, the agent cause of our own actions. 
Whether agent causation in this sense can ultimately be reduced to event 
causation, or perhaps to an ingenious combination of event causation and 
random chance, is a separate issue—related, perhaps, to the remaining 
point of dispute between compatibilists and libertarians. But in any case, 
the idea of agent causation, as I have just explained it, is no more (nor less) 
mysterious than the idea of a rational agent whose reasonable judgments 
concerning the best course of action determine his or her own actions.
Now finally, the idea that God’s freedom is the ideal freedom also car-
ries important impli cations for the problem of evil and, in particular, for 
any freewill defense that a theist might want to embrace in response to it. 
Some may even worry that the above sufficient condition of acting freely, 
namely (SCF), undermines such a defense altogether. Outside the context 
of the logical or the deductive problem of evil, however, freewill defenses 
have always been of limited usefulness insofar as (a) they purport to of-
fer only a possible explanation for the existence of all evil, natural evil no 
less than moral evil, and insofar as (b) their proponents have allowed 
free choice to figure into their abstract calculations no differently than an 
utterly random event or chance occurrence would. My point is not that 
an appeal to freewill offers nothing of value to a theistic response to the 
problem of evil; to the contrary, even many compatibilists—Daniel Den-
nett, for example—will concede that we could not be free in relation to 
a purposive agent who causally determines (and thus controls) all of our 
actions.43 So if a purposive agent such as God cannot determine all of our 
42Although every theist of a traditional stripe ought, in my judgment, to regard 
God’s freedom as the ideal freedom, not even an atheist need disagree. For just as 
an ideal observer theory in ethics in no way requires the assumption that the ideal 
observer actually exists, neither does my assumption that God’s freedom would 
be the ideal freedom require the further assumption that God actually exists
43See Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cam-
bridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1984). Dennett distinguishes mere determinism 
from various non-coercive forms of control, arguing that, however exhaustively it 
may determine our future, “the past does not control us,” at least not in the way a 
purposive agent might. It does not control us in the latter sense because “there is 
nothing in the past to foresee and plan for our particular acts”; neither are there 
“feedback signals from the present to the past for the past to exploit” (p. 72). Re-
markably, Dennett even concedes that a Laplacean “superhuman intelligence” 
that also determines the future could easily control us and would indeed under-
mine our compatibilist autonomy (p. 61). As even Dennett appears to concede, 
therefore, not even compatibilist autonomy could exist in a theistic universe in 
which God causally determines every event
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actions without subjecting us to the wrong kind of external manipulation 
and without undermining our agency altogether, then that alone gives 
point to a theistic appeal to freewill. An adequate account of the role that 
rationality plays in freedom will also, I believe, give additional support 
to a soul-making theodicy.44 But that, of course, is the subject for another 
paper and for a much longer discussion.45
Willamette University
44Elsewhere I have suggested that, for all we know, God had no choice, pro-
vided he wanted to create any rational agents at all, but to start them out in a 
context of ambiguity, ignorance, and even indeterminism (see “Why Christians 
Should Not Be Determinists: Reflections on the Origin of Human Sin,” Faith and 
Philosophy 25 [2008], pp. 300–316). But even if he just had a morally sufficient rea-
son to start us out in a context where we could learn for ourselves important les-
sons from experience and from the consequences of our actions, his options would 
be limited at least to this extent: He could not both systematically protect us from 
the consequences of choices made in ignorance and permit these consequences to 
correct us and to teach us important lessons about the nature of our environment, 
about the conditions of our own happiness, or about the best way to live in relation 
to others.
45My thanks to Wes Morriston, William Rowe, and an anonymous referee for 
some incisive comments on the paper. Special thanks are due the editor, Tom Flint, 
for the incredible care with which he goes over a submitted paper.
